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“INGENIOUS ARGUMENTS” OR A SERIOUS 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM?   
A COMMENT ON PROFESSOR EPSTEIN’S 
PAPER 
Philip Hamburger∗ 
 In his observations about IRBs, Professor Richard Epstein makes per-
suasive arguments about the dangerous reach of the IRB laws, but he pref-
aces this policy analysis with a brief excursus into constitutional law that 
requires some comment.  His view is that the constitutional debate over 
IRBs arises not so much from a substantial constitutional problem as from 
“ingenious arguments.”1  Yet this conclusion rests on mistaken assump-
tions—both about the IRB laws and about the constitutional objections—
and because so much is at stake in the constitutional question, it is neces-
sary to point out the inaccuracies. 
The first set of mistaken assumptions relates to the IRB laws.2  Profes-
sor Epstein doubts there is any serious constitutional problem with the IRB 
laws, and certainly if they are understood in accord with popular assump-
tions about them, the constitutional issues are not as sharp as some of us 
have suggested.  The laws, however, repay careful study. 
On the question of the obligation of law, for example, it is taken for 
granted by Professor Epstein that the force of the IRB laws rests entirely on 
conditions that the federal government places on its research grants.3  In 
fact, the government ensures compliance with the Common Rule by relying 
not only on these conditions but also on state negligence law.4  The federal 
government no longer overtly pressures universities, as a condition of fed-
eral funding, to apply IRBs to research that lacks federal funding, but the 
 ∗  Maurice and Hilda Friedman Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. 
1  Richard A. Epstein, Defanging IRBs:  Replacing Coercion with Information, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 
735, 736 (2007) (link). 
2  By which is meant the Common Rule and the associated regulations and laws, federal and state—
not the FDA laws and regulations.  See Philip Hamburger, Getting Permission, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 405, 
406, 421 (2007) (link).  
3  Epstein, supra note 1, at 737. 
4  The Common Rule is the federal regulation that sets the basic federal standards for the licensing of 
human subjects research by IRBs.  45 C.F.R. § 46 (2005).  For the pressures felt by universities under 
state negligence law, see Research on Human Subjects:  Academic Freedom and the Institutional Re-
view Board, ACADEME:  BULL. OF THE AM. ASS’N OF U. PROFESSORS, Sept.–Oct. 2006, at 55, 60 (link).  
See also Hamburger, supra note 2, at 445–48. 
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government was able to abandon this requirement precisely because it had 
earlier used its conditions on research to elevate IRB licensing as the stan-
dard of care for research.  It could therefore rely on state negligence law to 
induce universities to apply IRBs to all human subjects research, regardless 
of the source of funding.5  As a result, although the conditions requiring the 
use of IRBs remain significant, and although they are probably unconstitu-
tional, the most far reaching constraint comes in the form of state negli-
gence law.  This is clearly a matter of state action and, if only on this 
account, one cannot easily conclude that the IRB laws lack sufficient obli-
gation of law to pose a constitutional problem. 
Professor Epstein is also mistaken about the IRB laws when he as-
sumes that they concern conduct rather than speech or the press.  This is 
certainly the popular view of the matter, and it is true that the government 
carefully drafted its regulations to apply to “research.”6  Yet the regulations 
define research as a “systematic investigation” designed to produce “gener-
alizable knowledge,” which was intended to mean attempts to produce sci-
entific hypotheses.7  In requiring universities to impose IRBs, the 
government even asks the universities to acknowledge that “generalizable 
knowledge” is that which is “expressed . . . in theories, principles, and 
statements of relationships.”8  As if this were not bad enough, it is widely 
recognized (not least by IRBs and government committees) that a “system-
atic investigation” designed to develop “generalizable knowledge” neces-
sarily means what a researcher “plans to publish” or what is 
“publishable”—this being part of the government’s scientific conception of 
research.9  Taken together, these details would seem to suggest that the IRB 
laws focus on speech and the press.  Of course, there is always room for a 
contrary perspective, and Supreme Court doctrine only confuses the matter, 
as I have argued at length.  But when the government insists that it is regu-
lating that which is “expressed . . . in theories, principles, and statements of 
relationships,” it is not unreasonable to take the government at its word. 
A final mistake about the IRB laws made by Professor Epstein is his 
assumption that the concerns about speech are merely incidental—that “the 
speech interests implicated in university research (especially in the bio-
medical area) are often tangential” or “‘incidental’” to the “major, or at 
least ostensible, purpose” of the regulations, which is protecting “health and 
safety.”10  This observation is problematic because it does not adequately 
 
5  See Hamburger, supra note 2, at 445–48. 
6  Id. at 430. 
7  45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (2005); see also Hamburger, supra note 2, at 430–31.  
8  NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND 
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, BELMONT REPORT:  ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192, 23,193 (Apr. 18, 1979); see also 
Hamburger, supra note 2, at 431. 
9  Hamburger, supra note 2, at 431–32. 
10  Epstein, supra note 1, at 736. 
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acknowledge the application of the regulations to behavioral research, in-
cluding purely verbal inquiry in the social sciences, the humanities, and 
various professional fields (including law and journalism).11  More cen-
trally, Professor Epstein’s assumption about the incidental character of the 
speech interests mistakes what IRBs typically do under the regulations:  
IRBs protect health and safety mostly by suppressing what is said and 
printed.  Whether acting directly or through various indirect mechanisms, 
IRBs deny permission until academics submit to modification and other 
censorship of their publications, their questionnaires, and even their conver-
sations.12  This censorship is the most common activity of IRBs—probably 
at a rate of at least 100,000 times a year and, by some estimates, many 
times that rate—and it is therefore difficult to conclude that the censorship 
is “incidental.”13  Professor Epstein’s conclusion that the speech interests 
are incidental to the goal of “health and safety” is perhaps most troubling 
because it ignores the government’s astonishingly broad conception of 
health and safety.  The regulations were carefully written to treat disturbing 
ideas and unsettling questions as a health risk, and when the law deliber-
ately categorizes provocative ideas and inquiries as a “health and safety” 
problem, the concerns about speech cannot be considered merely “inciden-
tal” to the question of “health and safety.”14 
These points about the IRB laws—that they rely on the direct force of 
law as well as conditions, that they focus on speech and the press, and that 
the First Amendment implications are not incidental—should already be 
enough to suggest the seriousness of the constitutional problem.  Of course, 
this is not to say that the IRB laws are necessarily unconstitutional.  Per-
haps, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s recent language, the govern-
ment can evade the First Amendment by using conditions to regulate and 
even license speech and the press.15  Perhaps the states can use the direct 
 
11  For the way IRBs have silenced students and academics in journalism schools, see Hamburger, 
supra note 2, at 471. 
12  IRBs will protest that they usually do nothing more intrusive than adjust informed consent docu-
ments, but that is precisely the point, for control over informed consent is one of the key mechanisms by 
which IRBs impose censorship.  IRBs often spell out their restrictions in the informed consent docu-
ments that IRBs require researchers to give to human subjects.  Accordingly, a process that sounds as 
innocent as the informed consent obtained by a doctor from his patient turns out, in fact, to be a mecha-
nism for suppression of speech and the press.  Id. at 433.  For the sharp differences between medical in-
formed consent and the informed consent required by IRBs, see id. at 438–39. 
13  See id. at 407, 469, 484; conversations with IRB members. 
14  For the treatment of “sensitive” questions under the IRB laws, see id. at 439, 460–63. 
15  For suggestive language about the constitutional limits regarding the government’s use of condi-
tions on speech in academic institutions, see Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) (link) (“[T]he 
university is a traditional sphere of free expression so fundamental to the functioning of our society that 
the Government’s ability to control speech within that sphere . . . is restricted by the vagueness and 
overbreadth doctrines of the First Amendment.”).  See also Rumsfeld v. F.A.I.R., 547 U.S. 47, 60 (2006) 
(link) (“Because the First Amendment would not prevent Congress from directly imposing the Solomon 
Amendment’s access requirement, the statute does not place an unconstitutional condition on the receipt 
of federal funds.”); Hamburger, supra note 2, at 445, 451. 
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force of law to impose licensing of speech and the press as long as the li-
censed activity is defined so broadly that it also includes “conduct.”  Per-
haps the consequences for speech remain merely incidental when disturbing 
speech is defined as a threat to “health and safety.”  Perhaps.  But whatever 
one thinks about such possibilities, the constitutional problem is sobering. 
The second set of mistaken assumptions involves Professor Epstein’s 
understanding of the constitutional objections.  Most generally, he assumes 
that my analysis of the IRB laws is a claim about the surface of Supreme 
Court doctrine and the likely outcome of any litigation.16  My argument, 
however, has always been that Supreme Court doctrine has given the ap-
pearance of constitutional legitimacy to the IRB laws and that these laws 
thereby reveal why such doctrine needs to be reconsidered.17 
More concretely, Professor Epstein is under the impression that “the 
major constitutional attack” on the IRB laws “treats them as a garden-
variety form of prior restraint.”18  Such an argument would, indeed, be an 
uphill struggle.  My argument, however, specifically rejects analysis in 
terms of prior restraint and instead focuses on the question of licensing.19  
Although the surface of Supreme Court doctrine on prior restraint does not 
distinguish between licensing laws and judicial injunctions, the cases treat 
the former more severely, and with good reason, for licensing is widely 
recognized as more dangerous than injunctions.20  It is open to debate 
whether my argument about licensing is correct, but given that my articles 
on the subject focus on the distinctive character of licensing and how li-
censing differs from the more general question of prior restraint, it is puz-
zling why anyone would suggest that my argument treats the IRB laws “as a 
garden-variety form of prior restraint.”  This is exactly what my work does 
not do. 
Professor Epstein further mistakes the constitutional objections when 
he discusses the distinction between facial and applied challenges.21  It is 
true that my argument distinguishes between First Amendment tests based 
on the words of the regulations and those based the words of the persons 
regulated.22  It does not address, however, the question of facial and applied 
challenges or any other question about the posture of litigation. 
 
16  See Epstein, supra note 1, at 736–37. 
17  See Hamburger, supra note 2, at 407, 410, 440, 452, 491–92.  In fact, the debilitating effect of 
Supreme Court doctrine is the primary theme of Philip Hamburger, The New Censorship:  Institutional 
Review Boards, 2004 SUP. CT. REV., 271, 277–81, 353–54. 
18  Epstein, supra note 1, at 736. 
19  The very title of Getting Permission indicates its main theoretical point:  that licensing differs 
from other prior restraint because it requires one to get permission.  Hamburger, supra note 2, at 405 
passim. 
20  Id. at 415. 
21  Epstein, supra note 1, at 736. 
22  Hamburger, supra note 2, at 429, 437. 
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In sum, although Professor Epstein’s paper is illuminating on the pol-
icy question, it is disappointing on the constitutional problem because it 
rests on mistaken assumptions.  Many commentators have been misled by 
popular assumptions about IRBs, but this is all the more reason to dig 
deeper into the regulations and the constitutional law and thereby to con-
front the grim reality.  
The danger is nothing less than licensing of academic attempts to form 
scientific hypotheses.  It is an assault on freedom that rises far above ordi-
nary government intrusions and harks back to the fate of Galileo.23  The 
particular constitutional threat is the licensing of speech and the press—an 
utterly repressive mode of control, which was abandoned in the seventeenth 
century, prohibited in the eighteenth, and surreptitiously revived in the 
twentieth.  More generally, the constitutional threat arises from the Su-
preme Court’s own First Amendment doctrine. In developing its doctrine on 
speech and the press, the Court ended up giving the appearance of legiti-
macy to the very laws—licensing laws—that the Constitution’s speech and 
press guarantees were most clearly designed to forbid.24  This legitimization 
of licensing is disturbing, and how it happened, and how it has been used 
against academics, is something that an academic might well take seriously.  
 
23  See id. at 47–83. 
24  See id. at 407, 410, 440, 452, 491–92; Hamburger, The New Censorship, supra note 17, at 277–
81, 353–54. 
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